IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRIC EASTERN DISTRICT OF Alexandria Divis	VIRGINIA
SUHAIL NAJIM ABDULLAH AL SHIMARI, et al., Plaintiffs, VS. TIMOTHY DUGAN, et al., Defendants.	Civil No.08-cv-827 November 1, 2012
MOTIONS HEARING	
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE GERALD BR UNITED STATES DISTRICT	
<u>APPEARANCES</u> :	
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: BURKE, PLLC BY: SUSAN L. BUR SUSAN M. SAJ CENTER FOR CONST BY: BAHER AZMY, KATHERINE GA	ADÍ, ESQ. ITUTIONÁL RIGHTS
FOR THE DEFENDANT: STEPTOE & JOHNSO BY: JOSEPH WILLI JOHN O'CONNO	AM KOEGEL, JR., ESQ.
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER: RENECIA A. U.S. Distri 401 Courthor Alexandria, (703)501-15	ct Court use Square, 5th Floor VA 22314

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(Thereupon, the following was heard in open 1 court at 10:15 a.m.) 2 THE CLERK: 1:08 civil 827, Al Shimari versus 3 Dugan, et al. 4 MS. BURKE: Good morning, Your Honor. Susan 5 Burke for the plaintiffs. 6 7 THE COURT: Good morning. MS. BURKE: And Mr. Baher Azmy and 8 Ms. Katherine Gallagher from the Center For 9 Constitutional Rights and my colleague, Susan Sajadi. 10 Mr. Azmy has come down from New York today to 11 do the argument. 12 THE COURT: All right. 13 MR. KOEGEL: Good morning, Your Honor. Bi11 14 Koegel and John O'Connor for the CACI defendants. 15 THE COURT: Good morning. 16 MR. O'CONNOR: Good morning, Your Honor. 17 Ms. Burke said a lot of names. THE COURT: 18 Tell me your name again. 19 MR. AZMY: Good morning, Your Honor. Baher 20 Azmy, A-Z-M-Y from The Center For Constitutional Rights. 21 THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Azmy. 22 MR. AZMY: Good morning. The Center For 23 Constitutional Rights has been in these cases for a long 24 time, but this is my first appearance before Your Honor. 25

THE COURT: This case has been around a long 1 time. 2 MR. AZMY: It has. And today we seek this 3 Court's reconsideration of its 2009 order dismissing 4 plaintiffs' Alien Tort Statute claims for war crimes, 5 torture and cruel and inhuman and degrading treatment. 6 7 It's clear that this Court has plenary authority under Rule 54(b) to reconsider its decision 8 dismissing those claims. And we contend that it's 9 particularly appropriate at this stage of the 10 proceedings, at this procedural juncture to do so for a 11 number of reasons. 12 First, there have been significant legal 13 developments since Your Honor's decision in 2009 on this 14 Specifically Judge Lee in *In re Xe Services* question. 15 and -- sorry, Judge Ellis in *In re Xe Services* and Judge 16 Messitte in the companion case to this case, Al-Quaraishi 17 v. Nakhla, a case which I think is on all fours with this 18 case, both held that federal courts have jurisdiction to 19 hear war crimes claims under the ATS against private 20 military contractors such as CACI who are operating in 21 Iraq. 22 In addition, there have been a number of 23 Court of Appeals decisions in the Seventh Circuit in 24 Flomo and the DC Circuit in Exxon and in the Ninth 25

1	Circuit in Sarei which we all discussed in our brief
2	which also hold that ATS norms can be applied against
3	private entities and corporate entities.
4	These are all persuasive decisions, Judge
5	Ellis and Judge Messitte's decision. We would urge you
6	to review as you consider this motion. And we believe
7	that this creates a legal consensus, an emerging legal
8	consensus going in the opposite direction since
9	THE COURT: Well, we have two district judges
10	and we have three circuits that say that there could be a
11	claim under the ATS for war crimes and that corporate
12	liability would attach.
13	MR. AZMY: Right.
14	THE COURT: The Supreme Court has the Kiobel
15	case. Is that how it's pronounced?
16	MR. AZMY: I believe <i>Kiobel</i> .
17	THE COURT: <i>Kiobel</i> case.
18	MR. AZMY: That's right, Your Honor, yes.
19	So there's one Court of Appeals case that has
20	gone in the other direction from the three Court of
21	Appeals cases.
22	THE COURT: Is that the Fifth Circuit?
23	MR. AZMY: That's from the Second Circuit
24	with a dissenting opinion.
25	So Kiobel because that Court held that

1	corporations are exempt from ATS liability were a strong
2	dissent from Judge Leval, and it's that decision that the
3	Supreme Court is going to review in <i>Kiobel</i> .
4	And this takes us to what I think are some of
5	the equities for why in addition to the significant legal
6	developments this is a good moment to reconsider the
7	decision.
8	First, the defendants have identified no
9	prejudice that would ensue from reinstating these claims
10	now.
11	No discovery has occurred. And there's a
12	question here about the Court subject matter jurisdiction
13	which the Fourth Circuit
14	THE COURT: But the factual discovery would
15	be the same for this claim as others. Is that right?
16	MR. AZMY: Not necessarily, Your Honor. I
17	think and, I think the concern is if the Kiobel
18	decision ultimately vindicates the position that
19	plaintiffs have taken and reaffirms our position, we will
20	have lost an opportunity to undertake discovery during
21	this time. And we think it makes more sense to do
22	discovery along side the non-ATS claims.
23	THE COURT: Well, I guess my question was
24	whether the discovery would be the same in any event.
25	Because the facts that are alleged that underlie the

1	whole all the other claims are the same body of facts
2	that would be the subject matter of discovery anyway.
3	MR. AZMY: There may be, Your Honor,
4	substantial overlap. And it's simply hard to anticipate
5	all the contingencies and we strongly we're strongly
6	concerned that the defendants would oppose discovery that
7	may go to the war crimes and torture-related claims that
8	may go to questions of intent and purpose on the
9	discovery and war on the war crimes and torture
10	claims. And I think it makes more sense to have those
11	claims firmly in the case should there be disputes about
12	whether a particular line of discovery goes beyond merely
13	the state law claims and is relevant to the war crimes
14	claims.
15	It's far easier to bring those disputes, Your
16	Honor, with them in the case.
17	But I also want to stress, Your Honor, it's
18	not just about the discovery in the case, although it's
19	important.
20	What happened in this case is as we alleged,
21	we believe surely assault and battery. It's surely
22	sexual assault, and it's surely negligent supervision.
23	But it's much more. It's important to call what happened
24	what it is. What happened, war crimes, as we alleged,
25	torture, and cruel and inhuman and degrading treatment.

And Virginia surely -- the state of Virginia 1 surely has an interest in vindicating the Virginia state 2 common law torts of assault and battery. 3 But, the federal government, I believe this 4 Court and our plaintiffs also have a very strong interest 5 in vindicating the very strong federal norms regarding 6 7 war crimes and torture, and we know this for a number of reasons. 8 The United States in the *en banc* proceedings 9 in the Fourth Circuit filed an amicus brief largely 10 citing with plaintiffs and urging the Court to allow this 11 case to proceed precisely so that we could vindicate the 12 federal interests in the anti-torture statute in calling 13 this what it is. 14 Of course, we know, President Bush and 15 Congress and the generals have decried what happened in 16 Abu Ghraib as egregious and beyond the pale. And theirs 17 is something more than just sexual assault going on here. 18 And I think --19 THE COURT: Well, I appreciate that, but I 20 quess what I'm confronted with is the circumstance where 21 the matter has come back 3 years later. There have been 22 developments in the case law, and I have reviewed many of 23 the cases that you all have identified, including the 24 District Court decisions. But I'm focused more on the 25

Circuit decisions. We don't have a defendant's decision 1 in our circuit. DC Circuit certainly would be helpful, 2 and there are a couple others. 3 I quess the question is whether since I did 4 not do a full analysis the last time, in light of the 5 developments in the law it's appropriate to allow first 6 of all reconsideration under Rule 54 and then also to 7 allow the claim to go forward. 8 MR. AZMY: Uh-huh. 9 THE COURT: And this is a motion to dismiss. 10 MR. AZMY: Uh-huh. 11 THE COURT: We have no way of knowing what 12 the Supreme Court's going to do in *Kiobel*. But if I 13 allow -- reinstate the claim after *Kiobel* if that has any 14 impact in the decision, I can then revisit the matter. 15 MR. AZMY: Yes, Your Honor, if you reinstate 16 the claims now, allow discovery to proceed and in my view 17 the unlikely event that *Kiobel* holds that corporations 18 are exempt from liability, at that point the defendants 19 could move to dismiss the claims at summary judgment or 20 before trial. 21 And there would be no prejudice to the 22 defendants to have those claims in the case now. And if 23 *Kiobel* reaffirms plaintiff's position on the corporate 24 liability question, then it would have made more sense to 25

pursue these claims along side each other. 1 THE COURT: All right. I think I understand 2 your position. Let me hear from Mr. Koegel. 3 MR. KOEGEL: Thank you, Your Honor. 4 To hear the plaintiffs' motion, you'd think, 5 this was a very simple matter. All the Court has to do 6 under the plaintiffs' approach is determine whether 7 there's an international norm with the requisite 8 specificity for torture or war crimes or cruel and 9 degrading treatment. 10 And if the Court concludes the answer is yes, 11 we're done. The claim goes forward. 12 It's not that simple. It's not the approach 13 the Supreme Court used in *Sosa*. It's not the approach 14 that the Court of Appeals have used in assessing ATS 15 claims as we've cited in our brief. For example, the DC 16 Circuit and the Second Circuit both talk about the 17 necessity to go beyond that. 18 The Court in its original decision on our 19 motion to dismiss in fact employed the second step of the 20 Sosa analysis, looking to determine whether the five 21 special factors identified in Sosa cause -- dictated the 22 Court should exercise great caution which is the term the 23 Supreme Court used in Sosa in the second step, great 24 caution, in allowing a cause of action to proceed. 25

And when the Court looks at those five 1 special factors, the core principle is what has the 2 legislature done. What has Congress had to say that 3 would be relevant and would inform the Court's judgment? 4 We know the answer to that question based 5 upon the Fourth Circuit's decision earlier this year in 6 7 the *Lebron* case in which the Fourth Circuit in the analogous context of determining whether to recognize a 8 Bivens action, to permit a Bivens action for detainee 9 abuse to proceed, determined that Congress had given 10 repeated, continuous and substantial attention to this 11 matter and had not determined to permit a private cause 12 of action. And as a result, the Court was not going to 13 disregard Congress' action and allow a *Bivens* claim to go 14 forward. 15 The same result obtains here. If the Court 16 looks at the relevant action by Congress, we have the 17 combatant activities exception to the FTCA which Congress 18 has not changed which bars any tort claims arising from 19 the combatant activities in the military. 20 We have the Federal Torture Statute which 21 provides only a criminal penalty. There is no civil 22 cause of action available. 23 We have the War Crimes Act, again, a federal 24 statute that provides only a criminal remedy. 25

1	And the United States has never charged
2	either CACI or any of its personnel with any violations
3	of any federal criminal statutes.
4	We have the Tortured Victims Protection Act
5	which does provide a civil remedy but only only for
6	actions arising under color of foreign law.
7	We can all agree that the photographs that
8	came out of Abu Ghraib are abhorrent, reprehensible at
9	best.
10	Congress has clearly focused on this
11	situation repeatedly over the years, and it has not
12	determined to provide a civil cause of action to these
13	plaintiffs under any federal statute.
14	That caused the Fourth Circuit in Lebron to
15	determine that it would be inappropriate to recognize a
16	Bivens action. That reasoning applies with equal force
17	here. It's the Court of Appeals' decision that we submit
18	is of greatest relevance and significant to the Court's
19	decision on ATS.
20	There's a second point that that applies
21	here as well. The plaintiffs approach this as if we were
22	relitigating the motion to dismiss.
23	We directed our arguments in our opposition
24	memorandum to those that they had made in their motion
25	seeking reconsideration. We didn't go back and seek to

relitigate every single legal issue that was present in 1 the motions to dismiss. 2 The result will -- in the reply brief the 3 plaintiffs submit, well, the defendants don't assert A or 4 they don't assert B. Well, there's a reason for that. 5 It wasn't raised in their motion seeking reconsideration. 6 We restricted our arguments to the matters they had 7 raised. 8 They argued that well there would be no 9 prejudice to CACI in reinstating these claims. 10 That misses the point. The question is 11 whether there is a valid basis in law for reinstating 12 these claims. If there is, then the motion should be 13 granted. If there's not, as we submit, then prejudice is 14 quite irrelevant. 15 CACI, in any event, should not be required to 16 have to defend in discovery and otherwise claims that 17 have no legal merit. 18 And, the request to reinstate the ATS claims 19 falls short of the standard required by -- by this Court 20 for --21 THE COURT: Well, the Supreme Court is 22 considering the *Kiobel* case now, and the plaintiff has 23 cited I think three Circuit cases that have addressed 24 this issue that I don't think were available to us at the 25

1	time of my original decision on this matter.
2	Should I wait and see what the Supreme Court
3	does in <i>Kiobel</i> ?
4	MR. KOEGEL: Probably not necessary, Your
5	Honor, because <i>Kiobel</i> presents the Supreme Court with two
6	issues. Originally cert was granted on the issue of
7	whether corporations could be liable under the ATS.
8	After oral argument on that point, the Supreme Court
9	asked for submission of additional briefs on a second
10	question dealing with the extraterritorial issue.
11	That is, could claims that arise in a foreign
12	country have no seeming connection to the United States,
13	be brought under ATS?
14	So those are the two issues pending in the
15	Supreme Court on <i>Kiobel</i> . And we submit that however the
16	Supreme Court comes out, there's still an inadequate
17	basis to permit these ATS claims to go forward, given the
18	Sosa analysis that the Court's required to undertake,
19	that at the time you issued your initial decision, <i>Kiobel</i>
20	had not been decided by the Second Circuit. And
21	prevailing view was to the extent there had been any law
22	developed on the issue was corporations were amenable to
23	suit under the ATS. The Second Circuit in <i>Kiobel</i> said,
24	no they were not, and the Supreme Court decided to review
25	that decision.

1	But whether the Supreme Court decides Kiobel
2	on the extraterritorial application issue or the
3	amenability of a corporation to suit, this Court doesn't
4	get to those issues unless it concludes that one, there
5	is an international norm that existed in 2003 and 2004,
6	and it's a plaintiff's burden to show that, and they
7	didn't make that showing in connection with their
8	original submission. And nothing has really changed in
9	that respect since the Court's decision in 2009.
10	We've got two District Court decisions that
11	have come down that we believe suffer from the same flaw
12	in analysis that the plaintiffs' approach take.
13	In fact, they cite those two decisions as
14	support for the simple approach they take in urging
15	simply determine whether there's an international norm
16	with requisite specificity, and if the answer is yes,
17	you're done. There's no room in
18	THE COURT: There are five considerations in
19	Sosa that have to be taken into account, and I think I
20	did take those into account.
21	But I the Doe versus Exxon Mobile case
22	corporations are not immune from liability under ATS.
23	There are other decisions out there now that suggest
24	otherwise about what my original ruling was.
25	What impact, if any, should that have on my

consideration? 1 MR. KOEGEL: Virtually none, Your Honor, 2 because as we've indicated Sosa requires specific 3 application of the context in which the claim arise. 4 THE COURT: To the facts of this particular 5 case before the Court, not a general matter of what the 6 7 rules might be. MR. KOEGEL: Exactly, exactly. 8 THE COURT: All right. 9 That was the approach you took MR. KOEGEL: 10 in your 2009 ruling. It was correct then. It remains 11 the law today. 12 As a result, those cases are dependent upon 13 the context from which those claims arose. 14 And, while it may have been appropriate in 15 those cases, the facts are traumatically different to say 16 the least. And the question remains whether the context 17 from which this case arises provides a basis for 18 recognizing that in 2003 and 2004, there was a 19 universally recognized international norm with the 20 requisite specificity required by *Sosa* to permit ATS 21 claims for torture, war crimes and cruel and inhuman 22 treatment brought by detainees against a civilian 23 contractor, a novel proposition at best. 24 And particularly given the special factors 25

that Sosa dictates must be examined by the Court which 1 the plaintiffs don't address at all, not at all. 2 The *Lebron* court did. And *Lebron* provides 3 compelling -- a compelling basis to conclude that those 4 special factors dictate the Court not recognize these 5 claims in this context. 6 7 THE COURT: All right. MR. KOEGEL: It's really that simple at the 8 end of the day. 9 The Court could determine to wait on *Kiobel*. 10 But given the vagaries of that case and given that even 11 if the Supreme Court rules that ATS can be applied in an 12 extraterritorial manner and that corporations are liable, 13 that won't eliminate the need to conduct the Sosa 14 analysis at the very threshold of consideration for ATS 15 claims. 16 So, obviously if the Supreme Court says 17 corporations can't be liable, the matter is quite simple. 18 But we're not at that point. The Court's confronted with 19 a motion for reconsideration to reinstate the ATS claims. 20 Unless there's a valid legal basis to do that, the motion 21 should be denied, and we think there's the -- the 22 plaintiffs have fallen far short of the showing required 23 under Sosa to put those claims back into this case. 24 As Mr. Azmy acknowledges, discovery will be 25

affected by the presence of ATS claims. For example, the 1 Fourth Circuit's decision in the Aziz case which rejects 2 the knowledge standard advocated by plaintiffs and 3 requires much more, that's going to require discovery 4 into corporate purpose, corporate intend, and questions 5 that are going to arise about potential respondeat 6 superior liability that won't be present in discovery for 7 common law -- the common law tort claims that plaintiffs 8 seek to advance. 9 So, we think that the scope of discovery will 10 also inform the Court's judgment about whether to 11 reinstate those claims at this point in time, because it 12 will expand what we need to address in discovery on a 13 going forward basis. 14 THE COURT: Thank you. 15 MR. AZMY: Your Honor, may I --16 THE COURT: Yes. 17 MR. AZMY: -- respond to a couple of those 18 points. 19 I'd like to talk about the merits of the ATS 20 claim and respond to counsel's assertion that we are 21 somehow oversimplifying the question. 22 Now --23 THE COURT: What about the Sosa 24 considerations? 25

RENECIA A. SMITH-WILSON, RMR, CRR

1	MR. AZMY: Your Honor, under <i>Sosa</i> , this Court
2	is required to ask three questions. One, is the norm at
3	issue universally accepted? Two, does it have definite
4	and specific content? And three, is it obligatory,
5	rather than merely aspirational?
6	Now, these five Sosa factors that Your Honor
7	stress and that defendant incorrectly, categorically
8	incorrectly call a second somehow escalating step are
9	incorporated into the high standard.
10	If you read <i>Sosa</i> , the Court starts with this
11	notion that "federal courts should be cautious in light
12	of their limited role, visa-vie Congress in creating new
13	international law causes of action". They don't want to
14	invite willy-nilly some causes of action that might
15	disrupt foreign policy.
16	And so, in order to guard against that
17	possibility, any norm to be to be accepted under <i>Sosa</i>
18	has to meet those three criteria. It's embedded in the
19	test. And now there may be some
20	THE COURT: I'm not so sure they are embedded
21	in the test. And that's one of the concerns I have. And
22	that is, as you say create a new cause of action, what
23	are the contours of it, how is it established, what
24	causation is required?
25	MR. AZMY: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: How do you approve it? How do I 1 instruct the jury? Those are all factors that trial 2 judges take into consideration. 3 And, Ms. Burke has heard me say this, 4 district judges don't like to be first. 5 Can you cite me to a case where a case like 6 7 this has gone to trial on an ATS claim? MR. AZMY: Well, a number of cases have 8 settled before trial and the --9 THE COURT: So, the answer is no, not one has 10 ever gone to trial? 11 MR. AZMY: Let me give it some --12 THE COURT: You've had a lot of time. 13 MR. A7MY: The Kadic case from the Second 14 Circuit, Your Honor, which held that private entities, 15 non-state actors can be liable for war crimes. And I 16 want to stress --17 THE COURT: That one did go to trial? 18 MR. AZMY: I believe it did, yes, yes. 19 THE COURT: So I'd be the second judge in 20 America to do this it if I did, then? 21 MR. AZMY: Well, Your Honor, perhaps. 22 But there are -- let me talk about why it should not be 23 complicated to at least try the war crimes claim. 24 Now, defendants raise some ambiguity about 25

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1	the torture claim because there is some question about
2	whether or not torture can apply to non-state actors.
3	And, I want to put that to the side one
4	second. Judge Messitte deals with that very thoroughly,
5	and focus on war crimes, because this is the point that
6	we underscore the defendants drop in their opposition
7	brief.
8	There can be no dispute that respectfully,
9	that war crimes meet the Sosa standard.
10	One hundred and eighty countries have adopted
11	the Geneva Conventions, including the U.S. and Iraq.
12	That goes to universal acceptance.
13	Number two, the Geneva Conventions define
14	grave breaches of the conventions as war crimes, and
15	include in that torture, cruel and inhuman and degrading
16	treatment very specifically. That goes to specific and
17	definite content.
18	Finally and very critically, Your Honor, in
19	1996, Congress passed the War Crimes Act which
20	criminalizes grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions as
21	war crimes. That goes to it being obligatory.
22	THE COURT: But it did make it a claim or
23	cause of action for a civil liability, did it?
24	MR. AZMY: It didn't make it it didn't
25	make it a claim for civil liability. That's what ATS

1	does. And that's why every court, Your Honor, that has
2	considered the question finds has concluded that war
3	crimes, especially, is specific, universal and
4	obligatory.
5	THE COURT: And that's putting to the side
6	cruel, inhuman
7	MR. AZMY: For now, which I acknowledge
8	which the defendants raised some ambiguity about. We
9	believe based on Judge Messitte's analysis you could
10	apply it to non-state actors.
11	But War Crimes is clear, and you could avoid
12	dealing with the torture, cruel and inhuman norm by just
13	ruling that war crimes, which unambiguously apply to
14	non-state actors, to private entities, because the Geneva
15	Conventions do not distinguish between the type of
16	perpetrator, nor does the War Crimes Act. They focus on
17	the victim.
18	And there's no, as the DC Circuit and the two
19	district courts and the Flomo decision in the Seventh
20	Circuit very strongly say, corporations are not exempt
21	from these prohibitions simply because they have a
22	corporate structure, particularly where, under U.S.
23	agency law principles, a corporation goes in there, makes
24	billions of dollars on this contract based on what their
25	employees do, and then claims immunity from what the

employees do by virtue of its corporate structure. 1 All of the courts --2 THE COURT: I appreciate that position. Т 3 don't need you to recite all of the arguments if your 4 brief. I was focused more on the Sosa factors, and I've 5 raised the considerations that I have. 6 7 I think that I'm prepared to rule. I'm prepared to rule. 8 Thank you, Your Honor. 9 MR. AZMY: THE COURT: Let the record reflect this 10 matter is before the Court on the plaintiffs' motion to 11 reconsider the Court's dismissal of the Alien Tort 12 Statute claims. 13 And plaintiffs argue that the question of 14 corporate liability for ATS claims law has certainly 15 evolved since the time I heard the case in 2009. 16 And I concluded previously that the ATS claim 17 should not lie in this case. And I expressed great 18 concern then about the *Sosa* factors of what I considered 19 at that time to be the novelty of a government contractor 20 in a war zone being held civilly liable for an ATS claim 21 for the reasons set forth in my previous opinion. 22 I have reexamined the case law submitted to 23 me, and I don't want to skip over the question of whether 24 or not I could even do this procedurally. I think under 25

1	Rule 54, I can, and I should reexamine my previously
2	rulings, given the evolution of the law since 2003-2004
3	and my judgment. A lot has happened.
4	Sosa still remains the law, but I am
5	persuaded that there are new decisions that have come
6	from other courts that suggest that I should reexamine my
7	ruling, and so I will.
8	I think that the I'm not going to use the
9	word "consensus", but it seems to me, there is a growing
10	body of law that suggests that plaintiffs' claims which
11	encompass war crimes are within the purview of
12	international law, a norm of international law.
13	And under the ATS, "the Court has the
14	original jurisdiction of a civil action by an alien for
15	any tort committed in violation of the law of nations or
16	treaty of the states".
17	While Sosa says that the Congress did not
18	intend to create new causes of actions, the Court must
19	"require any claim based upon present law of nations
20	present day law of nations to rest upon the norm of
21	international character and accepted by civilized world
22	and define with specificity comparable to the features of
23	18th Century paradigms that Congress had in mind when it
24	enacted the ATS. And that's in <i>Sosa</i> pages 725.
25	Sosa refers to offenses against ambassadors,

violations of safe conduct and piracy. And the statute
does confer subject matter jurisdiction over a limited
number of offenses defined.

The Second Circuit in the F-I-L-A-R-T-I-G-A case and that's, *Filártiga* has acknowledged that torture, war crimes and genocide have been recognized as actionable under the ATS. And civil liability has been imposed for the torturer, just like for the pirate and the slave trader before him.

I declined to exercise jurisdiction at that time because I was of the opinion that the tort claims against the government contract interrogators were too modern and too novel to satisfy the *Sosa* requirements. And I went through some analysis of what I call the *Sosa* factors.

Two district courts, including Judge Ellis of 16 this court in the Xe Services case and Judge Messitte in 17 the Al-Quraishi and that's A-L-Q-U-R-A-I-S-H-I case, have 18 examined the issue in more detail than I did, on the 19 issue of whether or not corporations can be held liable 20 under the ATS and also looking at the norms of whether or 21 not war crimes are actionable under the ATS under Sosa. 22 And Judge Ellis in the Xe case which is the 23 Blackwater case determined that substantive claims can be 24 enforced against private non-state actors such as 25

Blackwater.

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And the case involving *L-3 Services* that Judge Messitte wrote concluded the claim of war crimes may be asserted against private actors apart from any state actions.

6 Whatever the Supreme Court might do in the 7 *Kiobel* case and that's K-I-O-B-E-L may or may not have 8 any impact on what we do here. But the case was just 9 argued, and I understand that they're competing views of 10 what that case involves.

But I am of the opinion that in this case that CACI is similarly situated as a corporate defendants in *Xe Services* and *A1-Quraishi* and could be liable and may be liable for violation of law of nations under ATS.

I am going to allow the claim to go forward for several reasons. First, because I think that the way the law has evolved, there is an argument that can be made that reasonable jurors could disagree about that there is a claim.

I think that there is enough here where war crimes clearly would fall within the purview of the ATS. And I do think that the case law concerning the Geneva Conventions is specific and universal and obligatory. The United States has adopted the Geneva Conventions. In my previous decision I did not separately address the issue of international norms. I'm
now making a judgment that I think that by ratifying the
Geneva Conventions, that is, define war crimes are
binding and universal, sufficient to establish a claim
here. And the actions that plaintiffs allege here are no
less specific in terms of their -- the allegations that
they made about what occurred.

Also, and another very important reason why I'm going to allow it is in the interest of judicial economy, this case has been pending for several years. I think it's time that we go forward with the discovery that needs to be done.

The discovery on this ATS issue should be done. If it turns out that the Supreme Court were to rule that corporations are not liable under ATS, then obviously on summary judgment I could take care of that.

I still may see this case on summary 17 I certainly expect to. And I do think that judgment. 18 the discovery should be fulsome on this issue as it 19 relates to all the other claims that are before the 20 Court, so that by the time we get to the end of the case 21 as it relates to discovery and motions practice, I'll 22 have a full record, and then, each side will have an 23 opportunity at that point to fully brief all the issues 24 that may remain involving summary judgment, including 25

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1	this claim it seems to me after discovery's concluded.
2	And, then we can decide about trial. And I
3	have the reservations I've expressed about how to try
4	such a claim being the second judge in America to try
5	one, ought to inform plaintiff of the concerns that I
6	have about whether or not this will survive all of that.
7	And if it does, that I would need
8	certainly need to see some real substantive briefing of
9	just how this matter would proceed.
10	So, for right now, I'm going to grant the
11	motion for the reasons I've just stated. And I will get
12	back to you all very shortly with a response on
13	submissions you made on discovery.
14	Thank you. You're excused.
15	MR. KOEGEL: Your Honor.
16	THE COURT: Yes.
17	MR. KOEGEL: May I?
18	THE COURT: Come to the podium, sure.
19	MR. KOEGEL: Point of clarification, will the
20	Court address which of the nine ATS counts it is
21	reinstating? The Court indicated in its ruling
22	THE COURT: Yeah.
23	MR. KOEGEL: that you were going to
24	reinstate the substantive war crimes counts. There are
25	counts for conspiracy and for aiding and abetting for

1	each of the three substantive ATS claims, leaving a total
2	of nine counts.
3	THE COURT: I'm reinstating all nine.
4	MR. KOEGEL: All nine?
5	THE COURT: Yes.
6	MR. KOEGEL: Thank you.
7	THE COURT: Thank you. You're excused.
8	MS. BURKE: Thank you, Your Honor.
9	(Proceeding concluded at 10:51 a.m.)
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1	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
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3	I, Renecia Wilson, an official court
4	reporter for the United State District Court of Virginia,
5	Alexandria Division, do hereby certify that I reported by
6	machine shorthand, in my official capacity, the
7	proceedings had upon the motions in the case of Al
8	Shimari, et al vs. Timothy Dugan, et al.
9	I further certify that I was authorized and
10	did report by stenotype the proceedings and evidence in
11	said motions, and that the foregoing pages, numbered 1 to
12	29, inclusive, constitute the official transcript of said
13	proceedings as taken from my shorthand notes.
14	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereto subscribed
15	my name this <u>19th day of August</u> , 2013.
16	
17	/s/
18	Renecia Wilson, RMR, CRR Official Court Reporter
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RENECIA A. SMITH-WILSON, RMR, CRR